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Anti-Contraceptive Laws
The recent Connecticut case upholding
the constitutionality of a statute forbidding
persons to use contraceptive devices or
physicians to prescribe them is commented
upon elsewhere in this issue of The Catholic Lawyer. The progress of the case
through the Connecticut courts has been
followed by many with great interest. Now,
the case has been carried to the United
States Supreme Court.
Regardless of the Supreme Court's ruling, the Catholic Church will not change
her judgment that the use of artificial contraceptives is contrary to both the natural
law and the divine positive law. But this
does not necessarily mean that the Church
favors such laws as the one in question in
Connecticut.
Rev. John Maguire, C.S.C., writing on
this subject in the June 1960 issue of Ave
Maria, argues that moral theologians are
agreed that a law which cannot be enforced is a bad law. In his opinion, a law
forbidding the use of contraceptives is
practically unenforceable and therefore a
bad law.
Father Maguire offers this interesting
explanation of his position with reference
to the present Connecticut and Massachusetts anti-contraceptive laws:

We would not say that the state never can
pass laws such as this, but that it can be
done only for the gravest of reasons and
when the acts outlawed are manifestly
against the common good. Error has no
rights, it is true, but persons - or consciences - in error do.
From these considerations, we feel that
a Catholic can justifiably favor repeal of
the Connecticut and Massachusetts anticontraceptive laws, or breathe happily if they
are declared unconstitutional. But, since
this is a purely prudential judgment, not
every Catholic would agree.
Perhaps some Catholics are in favor of
such legislation. Undoubtedly, many Catholics will deplore any ruling of the Supreme
Court that such laws are unconstitutional,
if such is, indeed, the court's ruling. Perhaps
they base their judgment on the constant
exhortations of the recent Popes to Christianize society and our social institutions.
But our own feeling is that this type of
law becomes meaningful only when society
itself has first been Christianized. And it's
quite debatable whether 20th-century America is Christian enough to benefit from such
a law.
It's difficult to forecast just how the Supreme Court will decide on the issue. What
is certain is only that it will arouse controversy. But let it be controversy marked not
by emotion, but by wisdom. Ultimately the
question is whether or not the Connecticut
law impinges on constitutional rights.
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There is a definite distinction between a
moral judgment about the use of contraceptives and a prudential judgment about the
wisdom of a law which forbids their use
and dissemination of information about
them. About the first, there is only one
Catholic position; as to the second, there is
no Catholic position, but only positions
taken by individual Catholics.
Artificial Insemination
Past issues of The Catholic Lawyer
have presented scholarly and well documented articles by Rev. Anthony LoGatto
on the legal and moral aspects of artificial
insemination. The most recent material to
be published elsewhere on this subject appears in the October 1960 issue of the
Catholic Mind, entitled "Artificial Insemination and the Law."
The article is a reprint of a statement
recently presented to the British Government's Departmental Committee on Artificial Insemination. The statement was prepared, on behalf of Catholics in England
and Wales, by a group of English Catholic
theologians, doctors and lawyers, at the
request of Cardinal William Godfrey,
Archbishop of Westminster.
The statement sums up the Catholic
Church's teaching on artificial insemination to the effect that respect for the order
divinely established in human nature requires that the generative faculty be used
only within marriage in conjugal intercourse. Artificial insemination of an unmarried woman is therefore rejected as well
as artificial insemination of a wife with
donor's seed. Artificial insemination of a
wife with the husband's seed obtained
apart from intercourse is also rejected; but
not what is termed "assisted insemination,"
whereby after the natural act of intercourse
the husband's seed is projected from the

vagina into the uterus. The statement concludes with the following legal recommendations:
The legal recommendation we consider
to be ideally necessary may not be considered capable of enforcement. Artificial
insemination by donor has such dangerous
potentialities that in the public interest we
recommend: That artificial insemination by
donor should be made an offence under The
Offences against the Person Act of 1861.
We recognize however that a legislative
measure of this kind may be judged to be
impracticable. If that be so, we urge that the
law should at least refrain from giving any
positive support or favor to A. I. D. and
those who practice it.
We recommend as both feasible and desirable in the public interest:
1) That the maintaining of a bank of
donors and the sale of semen be made illegal; 2) That the recognition by law of
antecedent and perpetual impotence as a
cause of nullity of marriage remain unchanged, even if a child has been born by
artificial insemination with the seed of husband or donor; 3) That in the event of a
woman being inseminated with the seed of
a donor without consent of her husband,
the husband be entitled to cite the inseminator and the donor as respondents or parties cited and to claim against them for costs
and for damages; 4) our attitude to divorce
is known but we consider that artificial insemination by donor should be made a
ground for judicial separation under the
same conditions as adultery, i.e., unless the
husband has consented to, or has condoned,
the insemination.
Federal Aid to Education
The September 1960 issue of The Catholic Educator contains an excellent article
by Rt. Rev. Msgr. Timothy O'Leary,
Superintendent of Schools, -Archdiocese of
Boston, dealing with the social and legal
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bases of government aid to Catholic
schools.
Monsignor O'Leary states that the fundamental postulates upon which the Catholic position toward federal aid is based are:
(1) If the concept of federal aid includes the idea of federal or any other kind
of governmental control which would destroy the antecedent educational rights of
the family or the supernatural educational
rights of the Church, then such aid is to
be rejected upon well-established social,
moral, constitutional, and traditional
grounds.
(2) If the concept of federal aid excludes children in nonpublic schools as
the legitimate beneficiaries of social services and economic advantages to which
they are entitled by virtue of their status
as part of the body politic, then it is to be
rejected as discriminatory.
Monsignor O'Leary contends that Catholic education, as a distinct but coordinate
system in the larger scheme of American
education, does not ask for either federal
or state funds to underwrite construction
or repair of parochial schools, to subsidize maintenance of them, or to pay teacher's salaries.
It does demand, however, that its subjects, as the offspring of present taxpayers
and as future citizens themselves, participate in whatever benefits and advantages
may accrue to the school population generally from the distribution of federal funds
for payment of auxiliary services.
Unfortunately, the whole issue of federal aid to private and parochial schools
has been beclouded by serious misunderstanding as to the true meaning of the
Jeffersonian concept of the "wall of separation" between Church and State. Misconstruction of this doctrine has tended to
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foster the notion that schools which supplement secular education with religious
instruction are inimical to the idea of separation of Church and State. This, in turn,
tends to confirm the fallacious reasoning
which contends that education of the youth
in the land is properly a state or government monopoly and that sectarian schools
exist only by government sufferance.
Until the decision by the Court in the
Illinois religious instruction case [McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203
(1948); see also Zorach v. Clauson, 343

U. S. 306 (1952)], we had cause to believe
that such invidious philosophy would find
little support in American constitutional
interpretation. The Oregon school case
[Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U. S. 510
(1925); see also Cochran v. Louisiana State

Bd. of Educ., 281 U. S. 370 (1930)], and
the New Jersey school bus case [Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U. S. 1 (1947)], had

previously led to the belief that the state
as parens patriae could legally and constitutionally provide social benefits to all its
children without regard to the type of
school attended. Then, however, the wall
of separation between Church and State
was enormously heightened into an impregnable barrier between public education and
any attempt to leaven its secularism with
religious or moral instruction.
The sweeping generalizations of the McCollum decision were fortunately modified
by the 6-3 ruling in the Zorach opinion of
1952. In that case the constitutionality of
released time off the school premises was
tested. This airangement was sustained
by all the New York courts as well as by
the United States Supreme Court.
The full meaning of the Zorach decision
is still a matter of some speculation. From
1952 until at least early 1960, the United
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States Supreme Court has not granted
review to any important Church-State
matter. As a result, it is not certain to
what extent Zorach would condemn various Church-State practices which are now
in litigation. In any event, Zorach is significant for the following reasons:
(a) The opinion contains the often cited
phrase by Justice Douglas who wrote for
the majority of six: "We are a religious
people whose institutions presuppose the
existence of a Supreme Being."
(b) The decision does not even mention
the "wall of separation" adverted to in the
McCollum opinion.
(c) The ruling, while stating that it does
not set aside McCollum, nonetheless affirms
that the separation of Church and State is
not an absolute and that the state may
accommodate its schedules to serve "the
spiritual needs" of its people.
If extension of federal aid to nonpublic
schools, particularly to Catholic schools,
should founder upon interpretations currently fashionable as to the meaning of the
"wall of separation between Church and
State" - interpretations, by the way, which
would probably amaze, if not shock, the
author of the phrase - then a nonlegal
phrase taken out of context will become a
constitutional norm superseding the narrowest interpretations of the "general welfare" and "equal protection" clauses of the
Constitution itself.
The "wall of separation" argument is
used today as a means of denying parental
rights conferred by the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution, e.g., by attempts to make it difficult for the parent
who wishes his children to get a Christian
education, by denying rights of transportation, free lunches, school adjustment counseling, etc., to Catholic schools, and to

drive the Catholic schools out of business
by taxation as was attempted recently in
California. Thus the enemies of the Catholic schools discriminate against Catholic
parents and children on the sole ground
that they are Catholics. Both are penalized
by the very fact of their religion.
Monsignor O'Leary concludes with the
following effective refutation of the "wall
of separation" argument:
The "wall of separation" works, indeed,
against the welfare of state and nation. As
Edwin S. Corwin has pointed out in his
criticism of the McCollum case, a democracy presupposes, if it is to work at all, a
people or citizenry morally responsible, and
there can be no real moral training unless
it is based on religion. In this statement
Professor Corwin has given an excellent
summary of judicial thinking on the subject
in America. Therefore, when separationists oppose schools where religion is taught,
they are denying state and nation of the

very thing government requires for its existence.
In the states, and in federal provisions
where they affect the schools of the nation,
discrimination results from legislation which
treats matters of general welfare as exclusively public school matters, as in school
adjustment counselors, free lunches, etc.
In this whole matter we may recall the
words of Leo XIII in the encyclical, Rerum
Novarum. "No man may with impunity
outrage that human dignity which God

Himself treats with reverence; nor stand
in the way of that higher life which is the
preparation for the eternal life of heaven."

Loyalty Oath Affidavits
Ever since Congress passed the National
Defense Education Act of 1958, a controversy has raged between the colleges and
universities of the country over the requirements of a loyalty oath affidavit which the
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Act establishes as a condition precedent to
the grant of federal educational financial
assistance to individual students.
Rev. Joseph F. Costanzo, writing about
the required oath in the June 1960 issue of
the University of Detroit Law Journal,
states that the controversy really centers
on two considerations. First, may the
United States Government choose to exclude from its beneficiaries of a national
defense education program those students
who are unwilling to disavow disloyalty?
Secondly, should the university authorities
who object to the non-subversive disclaimer
do so to the extent of depriving deserving
and needy students of the right to make
their own choice at their institutions unimpeded?
Father Costanzo concludes his scholarly
and objective analysis of the pros and cons
of the problem with the following statement of his position on the matter:
Fortunately no one is obfuscating the atmosphere of discussion by imputing or insinuating less patriotism to any of the
critics - a charge which we think would be
undeserved as well as irrelevant to the rational merits of their position. My own considered opinion is that it is not even a
question of right or wrong. I personally find
the reasons justifying the retention of the
loyalty oath affidavit more convincing than
the reasons urging its repeal, and in several
instances I find their criticisms misleading.
It is heartening to observe that no fast and
clear line divides the supporters of the proviso from its critics, public from private
institutions of higher learning, religious or
church-affiliated schools from those which
are neither officially. Dissenters are found
within the same religious profession and
even amongst educational institutions of the
same religious order. Statistically the overwhelming number of schools cooperating
with the federal loan plan as it is, is sharply
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in contrast with the relatively few who
oppose it.
One last reflection. The argument that
the loyalty oath affidavit "represents an affront to freedom of belief and conscience"
bears within itself a premise of assault upon
the oath of allegiance - a dialectical nexus
that has not been lost altogether on at least
one Senator and a university group which is
urging the repeal of both in the National
Defense Education Act. We are of the opinion that the validity of the manner of reasoning and logic rooted in a doctrinaire conception of freedom will not stand the test of
reflection. Academics are not exempt citizens.
The Connally Reservation
John B. Gest's latest arguments in support of the retention of the Connally
Reservation appear in the October 1960
Pennsylvania Bar Association Quarterly.
Mr. Gest strongly advocates that repeal
of the Connally Reservation would be a
move against peace. He argues further that
if an unjust decision were made concerning
a matter within our domestic jurisdiction,
and we refused to comply, we would be
accused of violating our engagement, and
would stand convicted in the forum of
world opinion. It is better to avoid unjust
decisions in advance, by retaining the Connally Amendment, than to incur the ill
will consequent upon a breach of our
undertaking to observe them.
He concludes that the law that will advance World Peace is the law based on
recognition of man as endowed by his
Creator with rights to life, liberty and the
pursuit of happiness. This cannot be
merged with the ideology of communism
which recognizes nothing spiritual in man,
strips him of his rights and teaches that
treaties are to be kept only so long as
they serve the party and to be scrapped at
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will. Our Senators are the sworn guardians
of our constitutional liberties and they
would not be true to their oath of office
if they attempted to delegate to this foreign tribunal the determination of issues
that are essentially within our domestic
jurisdiction.
It would be a tragic blunder to transfer
the determination of our domestic jurisdiction from our own State Department,
where it belongs, to the World Court
which represents largely other systems of
law including that of a tyranny which seeks
our destruction. To promote peace and
law in the world we must keep America
strong and defend our concept of law and
the rights of man. That, according to Mr.
Gest, is the way to display our leadership.
Natural Law
Dean Joseph O'Meara of Notre Dame
Law School has recently taken the complex subject of natural law and with facile
pen explained it in a manner both lucid and
understandable to today's practicing lawyer. In his article, "Natural Law and Everyday Law," appearing in Volume 5 of the
Natural Law Forum (1960), he suggests
an approach to natural law which attempts
to make it useful on a day-to-day basis in
the perplexities with which practitioners and
judges constantly are confronted.
Law, he explains, is a good deal more
than an aggregation of already existing
rules, - it is a living process for the just
resolution of never ending human controversies and as such it receives a positive
contribution from natural law.
Precedent, constitution and statute often
point simultaneously in more than one direction, and as a consequence the answer
must be sought in sources beyond the relavant legal materials. What are the criteria

of choice among the alternatives which
virtually every case presents?
Dean O'Meara suggests that the criteria
include the principles of the natural law;
in other words,. when the nature of the
case warrants, the judge or the lawyer
should turn for guidance to relevant ethical
principles - those principles of conduct,
that is, "which are in keeping with man's
nature as it would be if it were able to
resolve its disharmonies and to surmount
its imperfections."
He sums up by stating:
Natural law in its usual meanings is not
very helpful in the day-to-day problems of
professional life. This could be remedied, I
suggest, and natural law made much more
fruitful if it were thought of as the contribution to law which can be made by ethics.
At the same time, of course, it would be
necessary to think of law as a process of
decision rather than as an agglomeration of
rules, a process in which the judge performs
not a mechanical but a creative function. In
so doing, he must of necessity rely, in the
end, on his own intellect, experience and
conscience. Thus he has urgent need for
guides to which he can turn in his recurrent
perplexities. My suggestion is that natural
law, in the sense in which I am using that
term, is one such guide.
Church-State
The recent presidential election campaign has so stirred the interest of the
American people in the relationship of
Church-State that a survey article dealing
with the historical and legal aspects of the
subject is sure to attract widespread attention. Just such an article appears in the
current November 1960 issue of Social
Order by Rev. Edward Duff, S.J.
Father Duff follows his thorough analysis of the legal and historical background
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of this controversial issue with a plea that
a satisfactory theology of religious toleration be worked out. He points out very
forcefully that there is a need of an adequate and affirmative argument establishing the theological validity of the acceptance of the American political system with
its separation of church and state provisions.
He concludes that in working out this

argument theologians will have a clear
set of facts to start from: the uninterrupted
and the consistent declarations of the
American hierarchy extolling, as fully satisfying the demands of Catholic teaching
and as fruitful for religion, a regime in
which responsibility for the growth of the
Kingdom of God is left uniquely in the
hands of his assigned agents, unassisted by
Caesar's functionaries.

IMMIGRATION
(continued)

tional Catholic Migration Congress held in
Assisi, Italy in September, 1957:

from the lack of mutual solidarity of men
and peoples!
Catholics face a special responsibility in
making known these principles which
should be determining factors in immigration laws. Most Reverend Edward E. Swanstrom, Auxiliary Bishop of New York and
Executive Director of Catholic Relief Services, National Catholic Welfare Conference,
said in his address to the Third Interna-

We as Christians cannot dare be behind
.governments, nor is it sufficient to be on a
par with the thinking of governments. We
must be far-ahead of governments and official bodies of all types. Too often, political
bodies aim only at what is expedient or temporarily possible. We, as groups of Christians acting out of immutable and clear
moral principles in the international scene,
must act as the never-silenced conscience of
mankind on such issues - even though our
objectives are not immediately realizable.

